Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 60

Issue 2

Article 5

2010

Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding and the Future of
School Strip Searches
Lewis R. Katz
Carl J. Mazzone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis R. Katz and Carl J. Mazzone, Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding and the Future of
School Strip Searches, 60 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 363 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol60/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
No. 1 v. REDDING AND THE FUTURE
OF SCHOOL STRIP SEARCHES
Lewis R. Katzt & CarlJ. Mazzonett
Every year in America, an unknown number of children in primary
and secondary schools are strip-searched by teachers or school
administrators, forced to remove pants and shirts, and sometimes to
expose their breasts and genitals, or even appear naked before school
officials. While most strip searches are individual, some students have
been compelled to undress in the presence of their peers.! In some of
these cases, it is not clear whether school officials are searching for
contraband-usually drugs, missing money, or stolen items-or
seeking to discipline, humiliate,2 or simply exert authority over the
t John C. Hutchins Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
A.B. Queens College (1959), J.D. Indiana University (1963). The authors thank Mike Benza for
his thoughtful comments on a draft of this Article and Katherine J. Middleton (J.D. 2008),
Joshua Bobrowsky, and Michael McGregor for their research assistance.
tt B.A. University of Dayton (2005), J.D. Case Western Reserve University (expected
2010).
1 See, e.g., LibertarianRock.com, Strip-Searched Students Receive $5000 Each,
http://www.libertarianrock.com/topics/stripsearchl5000search.htnml (last visited Aug. 6, 2009).
In May 1997, a student in Green County, Virginia reported $100 missing from his wallet after
gym class. School officials "forced about 50 students from three gym classes to strip down to
their underwear and then searched their clothes." Id. Some of the students sued, and later settled
for $5000 each. Id.
2 For example, in rural southeastern Missouri, a teacher who discovered $55 missing
from her desk singled out ten girls ranging in age from twelve to fifteen years old. See District
Concedes Strip-Search to Settle Suit, WORLDNETDALY.COM, Aug. 28, 2003, http://www.world
netdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE ID-34318. When the teacher's initial search of bags
and outer clothing turned up nothing, the teacher escorted the girls to the school nurse's office
for a more intrusive search. Id. The girls were required to "pull their shirts or blouses up over
their shoulders so the nurse could search under their bras [and then] unzip their jeans or slacks
and pull them down so the nurse could search inside . .. the waistband of the girls [sic] panties."
Id. The humiliating search failed to turn up any of the missing money and had detrimental
effects on at least one girl, who had nightmares and subsequently left the school. Id. After eight
months of wrangling, the district reached a settlement with the girls, wherein each girl received
$7,500 plus legal fees. Id. For an example of another egregious school strip search, see Jenkins
ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1997). In this case,
after two eight-year-old girls were implicated in the theft of $7 from a classmate, their teacher

363

364

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:2

students. 3 Strip searches generally come to light only when a student
has the courage to tell a parent what happened, and the parent is
sufficiently outraged to complain or sue the school. In other cases,
strip searches are uncovered because of the particularly egregious
factual circumstances surrounding them. Some of these cases will
then be reported in the media, but will eventually disappear for lack
of follow-up. Some have resulted in federal civil rights lawsuits,
many of which are resolved through summary judgment.4 Others have
likely gone unreported.
Only a handful of states prohibit strip searches entirely.5 Although
some states have standards governing school searches generally, most
have failed to adopt specific parameters for strip searches. Other

accompanied them to the restroom where she ordered the girls to enter the stall and come back
out with their underwear around their ankles. Id. at 822-23. No money was found. Id.
3 On May 2, 2007, Verna Ivey, a principal in Lame Deer, Montana witnessed four
seventh-grade boys off campus during lunch. See Becky Shay, Students Tell of Strip Search,
BILLINGS GAZETTE, May 10, 2007, http://www.montanaforum.com/modules.php?op=modload
When the boys
&name=News&file=article&sid=6547&mode=thread&order-0&thold=0.
returned, Ivey called the boys into her office, brought in her secretary as a witness, and read the
boys a section from the school disciplinary code. Id. Ivey then patted the boys down, asked them
to remove their pants, patted them down again, and finally asked the boys to put their thumbs
inside the waist of their underwear and jump up and down. Id. The entire search occurred
directly in front of a window in Ivey's office that looked into the main hall. Id. At least one
student saw the search transpire because he phoned his parents at home and told them that he
had just seen his brother "in his 'skivvies' in the principal's office." In the end, the search turned
up nothing more than a wood tick. Id. More troubling was that Ivey had been hired the previous
July and was suspended and reassigned as a teacher in October of 2006 for reasons that are
unclear. Id. She was reinstated as principal some time prior to conducting this search. Id.
4 See, e.g., Smart v. Morgillo, No. CIV.300CVl281PCD, 2001 WL 802697 (D. Conn.
July 10, 2001) (granting school officials' motion for summery judgment and holding the strip
search to be objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard); Singleton v. Bd. of
Educ. U.S.D. 500, 894 F. Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (same).
5 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 1997) (prohibiting school employees from
conducting body cavity or strip searches); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808A.2(4)(a)-(b) (West 2002)
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-6.1 (West 2009) ("Any teaching staff member, principal or
other educational personnel shall be prohibited from conducting any strip search or body cavity
search of a pupil under any circumstances."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-102 2 (West
2002) (allowing for searches reasonably related to the object of the search, but absolutely
prohibiting strip searches); WIs. STAT. ANN §§ 118.32, 939.51(3)(b), 948.50(3) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2008) (outlawing school strip searches and classifying them as class B misdemeanors
punishable by a fine not exceeding $1000, up to 90 days in jail, or both).
6 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302D(3) (2004) (permitting searches of "students or
minors, including their belongings and lockers," when school officials reasonably believe a
student is violating a school weapons policy, but failing to expressly address strip searches); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3(A)(2)(a) (2004) (permitting searches of students when the
administrator has reasonable grounds to suspect that the search will reveal evidence that the
student has violated the law or school rule, but only if the search is conducted in a manner
reasonably related to the purpose of search and is not excessively intrusive); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 167.166(2) (Supp. 2009) (allowing school employees to strip search students only if "a
commissioned law enforcement officer is not immediately available," and when the school
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states explicitly leave it to school boards and local schools to develop
governing standards. The vast majority, however, have no policy at
all.'
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 9 the first school search case heard by the
Supreme Court, the Court rejected New Jersey's assertion that
schoolchildren do not have Fourth Amendment rights while in
school.' 0 The Court upheld the warrantless search of a child at school
based upon "reasonable suspicion," a lesser standard than the Fourth
The T.L.O.
Amendment requirement of probable cause."
reasonableness standard, borrowed from the standard set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 12 allows a much more intrusive search of
schoolchildren than is allowed under Terry, which limits officers to a
frisk of the detained subject's outer clothing for weapons.
In a way, T.L.O. opened the floodgates for school strip searches.
Prior to T.L.O., the law regarding school strip searches appeared
fairly clear. Strip searches were invalid without at least "reasonable
cause,"1 4 and courts made clear that mass strip searches could not be

reasonably believes that the student has a weapon, explosive, or substance that poses an
imminent threat of physical harm to himself or another student); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4205
(2002) (allowing a physical search of a student based on the result of a student locker search, or
based on a tip from "a teacher, staff member, student or other person if such action is reasonable
to the principal," and falls within the standards of reasonableness enumerated in the statute).
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(VII) (2008) (requiring each district to
establish a concisely written discipline code including "[a] written policy concerning searches
on school grounds"); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-308 (LexisNexis 2008) (allowing
administrators to conduct a search if they have a reasonable belief that the student unlawfully
possesses an item, and permitting county boards to authorize teachers on school-sponsored trips
to conduct a similar search, except that the teacher must be designated in writing by a principal
as qualified to conduct a search and must have received training on how to do so); VA. CODE
ANN. § 22.1-279.7 (2006) (requiring local boards of education to consult with the state Attorney
General's office to develop guidelines for student searches, "including random locker searches,
voluntary and mandatory drug testing, and strip searches, consistent with relevant state and
federal laws and constitutional principles").
8 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The remaining thirty-eight states have no
policy regarding searches and seizures on school grounds.
9 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
10 Id. at 336-37.
"1 Compare id. at 337 ("Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard."), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
12 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13 Id. at 30.
14 See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1022 (1981). In Renfrow, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case involving two
drug-sniffing dogs that had detected the presence of narcotics on two high school students. Id
The students were strip-searched, but found not to have any drugs in their possession. Id. at 92.
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founded on generalized reasonable suspicion, and rather required
particularized suspicion with respect to the specific students
suspected of violating school rules or policy. 15 After T.LO., however,
some schools and lower courts stopped considering strip searches to
be different in kind or more serious intrusions than other school
searches of a student's possessions. 1 6 Compounding the problems
caused by the lesser standard was the fallback role of qualified
immunity. Courts since T.L.O. have generally refused to hold school
officials liable for the illegal strip searches because the Supreme
Court had not clearly established any prohibition against them. 17
In Safford Unified School DistrictNo. 1 v. Redding," the Supreme
Court finally directly addressed the issue of school strip searches, and

Although the district court noted that the drug dogs did create cause to support a search of the
students' pockets, it found the nude search based solely on that evidence to be patently
unreasonable, even under the less demanding .'reasonable cause to believe' standard." 475 F.
Supp. 1012, 1024-25 (N.D. Ind. 1979). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
reasoning on this point, 631 F.2d at 92, stating further that not only was this a constitutional
intrusion "of some magnitude" but that it was also "a violation of any known principle of human
decency." Id. at 92-93.
15 See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53-54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). In Lund, school
officials conducted a strip search on an entire fifth grade class of for $4 reported missing by a
student. Id. at 50. After an initial search of coats, lockers, shoes and socks found turned nothing
up, two female officials escorted the girls, and two male officials escorted the boys, to their
respective restrooms. Id. Once there, the students were ordered to strip down to their underwear,
and the officials searched their clothes. I. The court held:
[W]hile there need not be a showing of probable cause in a case such as this, there
must be demonstrated the existence of some articulable facts which together
provided reasonable grounds to search the students . . . . [Slome factors which

warrant consideration are: (1) the child's age; (2) the child's history and record in
school; (3) the seriousness and prevalence of the problem to which the search is
directed; and (4) the exigency requiring an immediate warrantless search . . . . It is
entirely possible that there was reasonable suspicion, and even probable cause, based
upon the facts, to believe that someone in the classroom has possession of the stolen
money. There were no facts, however, which allowed the officials to particularize
with respect to which students might possess the money, something which has time
and again, with exceptions not relevant to this case, been found to be necessary to a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. For this reason, the search must be
held to have been invalid under the Fourth Amendment, there being no reasonable
suspicion to believe that each student searched possessed contraband or evidence of
a crime.
Id. at 53-54 (internal citations omitted).
16 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 113, 120, 128, 138.
" See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that, although
the strip search of a student was unconstitutional because it lacked particularized suspicion, the
school officials' conduct was not so egregious that its unconstitutionality would be readily
apparent); Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that,
even assuming the strip search was unreasonable, the school board was entitled to qualified
immunity because the unconstitutionality of its actions was not established at the time of the
incident).
18 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
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one of its contributions is to make clear that strip searches are, in fact,
different in kind. 19 Savana Redding, a thirteen-year-old eighth grader
suspected of bringing prescription-strength Advil to school, was
required to strip down to her underwear and shake out her bra and
panties, thereby exposing her breasts and genitals to the two female
school administrators conducting the search. 20 The administrators
found no pills either in Savana's belongings or on her person.2'
Outraged by the incident, Savana's mother sued. The district court
and initial Ninth Circuit review found no Fourth Amendment
violation. 22 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed its position en banc,
holding that the search had violated Savana's Fourth Amendment
rights.2 3 The Supreme Court agreed.24 The Court's pronouncement
brought the subject of strip searches in schools to the surface, making
it clear that a school strip search is at the very least an extraordinary
intrusion that should be reserved for extreme and life-threatening
situations. Although it subsequently granted the school officials
qualified immunity, the majority acknowledged (or at least pretended)
that existing law did not previously recognize the extraordinary nature
of school strip searches.25
Justice Souter, for the eight-Justice majority on the Fourth
Amendment issue, wrote in a manner that made the outcome and the
law seem strikingly ordinary. The Court merely restated the law
already enunciated in T.L.O., and applied it to a search that was far
more intrusive than the search that uncovered marijuana in T.L.O.'s
26
purse.26
The Redding decision, however, is far from ordinary.
Redding recognized a sliding scale for reasonable suspicion: the
greater the intrusion, the more factual support school authorities must
have. 27 While perhaps this is a standard implicit in T.L.O., it eluded
many courts and authorities during the previous two and a half
decades. Moreover, in finding the strip search unreasonable, the
Supreme Court shed necessary light on, and clarified important
Fourth Amendment principles governing, the practice of school
searches. While not per se prohibiting strip searches, the Court laid

20
21

See id. at 2643.
Id. at 2638.
Id.

2

Id.

19

Id. (citing Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1081-87 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
24 Id. at 2643-44.
2 See id. at 2644.
2

26
2

Cf New Jersey v. T.L.0, 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).

See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642 (noting that "[t]he indignity of the search does not, of
course, outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in T.LO.").
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out Fourth Amendment governing principles, which should, finally,
substantially limit the number of strip searches that occur in
America's public schools.
This Article builds on the Redding Court's recognition that absent
an emergency situation where a pre-existing school district policy
guides the use of such intrusive measures, strip searches are
qualitatively different from other searches and should not be allowed
in schools. This Article proposes the following: (1) that strip searches
should be governed by strict policy; (2) that school boards
specifically authorize or prohibit such searches; (3) that school
districts publish system-wide policies governing the conduct of strip
searches; and (4) that school districts maintain system-wide records of
such searches. Further, this Article recommends that a strip search is
presumptively unconstitutional if there is no school district policy in
place. Part I of the Article sets forth the facts and procedural history
of Redding. Part II discusses the Fourth Amendment background
through T.L.O., as well as some of the pre-Redding lower court cases
that applied T.L.O. Part IR discusses Redding's attempt to rescue
T.L.O., and the implications Redding holds for all cases using a
reasonable suspicion standard. In addition, Part E highlights the
implications of the Court's failure to articulate what exactly
constitutes a strip search, while leaving the practice available to
schools for use in extreme circumstances. Part IV discusses why the
Court was wrong to grant qualified immunity to the school officials in
Redding, and summarizes the likely effects of the ruling on future
school searches. Finally, we identify the unresolved issues in this area
and discuss why states and school boards must either set forth specific
policy guidelines for school strip searches or face continuing
litigation and damages.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After a Safford Middle School student nearly died from taking
pills passed out by another student in 2002,28 the Safford Unified
School District adopted a zero-tolerance drug policy. 29 That policy
banned illicit substances and all prescription or over-the-counter
drugs, unless a student had prior permission to use them.30
28
29

Brief for Petitioners at 4-5, Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479).

30

Safford Unified School District Policy J-3050, provides as follows:

Id. at 5.

The nonmedical use, possession, or sale of drugs on school property or at school
events is prohibited. Nonmedical is defined as "a purpose other than the prevention,
treatment, or cure of an illness or disabling condition" consistent with accepted
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In October 2003, the mother of student Jordan Romero reported to
school officials, including Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson, that
several nights earlier, Jordan had become violent and sick to his
stomach because of pills another student had allegedly given to him at
school.31 Mrs. Romero also conveyed Jordan's further contention that
some students, including Marissa Glines and Savana Redding, were
bringing drugs and weapons to school.32 Jordan also described his
second-hand knowledge of an incident approximately ten weeks
earlier in which Savana allegedly provided alcohol at a party in her
family's camper prior to a school dance.33 At that dance, chaperones
described a group of eighth-grade students, including Marissa and

practices of the medical profession.
Students in violation of the provisions of the above paragraph shall be subject to
removal from school property and shall be subject to prosecution in accordance with
the provisions of the law. Students attending school in the District who are in
violation of the provisions of this policy shall be subject to disciplinary actions in
accordance with the provisions of the school rules and/or regulations.
For purposes of this policy, "drugs" shall include, but not be limited to:
* All dangerous controlled substances prohibited by law.
* All alcoholic beverages.
* Any prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission
to use in school has been granted pursuant to Board policy.
* Hallucinogenic substances.
* Inhalants.
Any student who violates the above shall be subject to suspension or expulsion, in
addition to other civil and criminal prosecution.
Id. at 2-3. In addition, Safford Unified School District Policy J-5350 provided further
guidance on permissible prescription drug uses:
Under certain circumstances, when it is necessary for a student to take medicine
during school hours, the District will cooperate with the family physician and the
parents if the following requirements are met:
* There must be a written order from the physician stating the name of the
medicine, the dosage, and the time it is to be given.
* There must be written permission from the parent to allow the school or the
student to administer the medicine ....
* The medicine must come to the school office in the prescription container or, if it
is over-the-counter medication, in the original container with all warnings and
directions intact.
Id. at 3-4.
3' Id. at 5-6.
32

Id. at 6.

33 Id.
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Savana, as acting unruly, and leaving in their wake a strong smell of
alcohol. 4 Chaperones later found a bottle of liquor and a pack of
cigarettes in the girls' bathroom, but they were unable to attribute the
contraband or the smell of alcohol to any individual student(s).
On October 8, Jordan handed Assistant Principal Wilson a white
pill allegedly given to him by Marissa Glines, and informed Wilson
that several students were planning on taking the pills together during
lunch.36 Peggy Schwallier, the school nurse, identified the pill as a
400 mg ibuprofen tablet available by prescription only. 37 Wilson
immediately removed Marissa from class.38 In the process, Wilson
asked Marissa about a planner that was on her desk, but Marissa
denied ownership or any knowledge of its contents. 39 As Wilson
began to escort Marissa from the classroom back to his office,
Marissa's teacher opened the planner and discovered several knives
and lighters, a cigarette, and a permanent marker.4 Marissa's teacher
brought the planner and its contents to Wilson, who then removed
Savana Redding from class and escorted her to his office.4 1
With Marissa in his office, Wilson asked his administrative
assistant, Helen Romero, to come in and serve as a witness to the
search he was preparing to conduct.42 Wilson asked Marissa to turn
her pockets inside out and open up her wallet.4 3 From her pockets,
Marissa produced a razor blade, several white pills matching the one
Jordan gave to Wilson, and one blue pill later identified as Naprosyn,
a prescription strength anti-inflammatory medication." When asked,
Marissa asserted that the Naprosyn must have "slipped in when
[Savana] gave me the [Ibuprofen]."45 At that point, Wilson believed
that he had enough information to connect the two and immediately
stopped questioning Marissa. He did not ask Marissa when Savana
allegedly gave her the pills, how many pills Savana allegedly gave
her, or where Savana would be hiding additional pills if she had
them. 46 Rather, Wilson had Romero escort Marissa to Nurse
34Id.
Id. at 5.

3

36Id.
37 Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
40 Brief for Respondent at 3, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009) (No. 08-479); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 7.
41 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 8.
42 Id. at 7.
3 Id.
38
39

Id.; Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
5 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 7.

44
46

Redding, 129 S. CL at 2640; Brief for Respondent, supra note 40, at 4.
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Schwallier so she could conduct a more thorough search.47 In the
nurse's office, Romero asked Marissa to remove her shirt and pants,
and to shake out the elastic of her bra and panties.48 The search failed
to reveal any additional pills. 4 9
After pulling her from class, Wilson emphasized to Savana the
importance of telling the truth and called her attention to the planner
and its contents spread out on his desk.o Savana admitted ownership
of the planner, but denied that its contents were hers.5 Savana
explained she had lent the planner to Marissa several days earlier.
Savana then stated that she had not previously seen the pills that were
also on the desk, and told Wilson she had never brought pills to
school or distributed pills to her classmates.M Wilson asked for
consent to search Savana's belongings and, again, found no drugs in
As he did with Marissa, Wilson had his
Savana's backpack.
assistant, Romero, escort Savana to the nurse's office for a more
thorough search.56 Wilson believed that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, including information about the earlier dance, he had
reasonable suspicion to strip-search Savana Redding 57
That particular day, Savana wore a t-shirt and pocketless stretch
pants. 8 Once inside the office, Romero asked Savana to remove her
shoes and socks, which turned up no indication of drugs. 59 Romero
and Nurse Schwallier then asked Savana to remove her shirt and pants
and pull her bra and panties to the side, exposing her breasts and
genitals to the school officials.6 0 Again, they found nothing.6 '
Throughout the search, Savana held her head down so Romero and
Schwallier would not see her cry.62 Savana later described the
63
incident as "'the most humiliating experience' of her life."
The search was especially troublesome because the assistant
principal conducting the investigation never really questioned the
7 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 7-8; Brief for Respondent, supra note 40, at 4.
48

Brief for Respondent, supranote 40, at 4-5.

49

Id. at 5.

so Id. at 1.
51 Id.
52 Id.
s3 Id. at 1-2.
s4 Id. at 2.
55 Id.
5 Id.

57 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 9-10.
s8 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009).
s9 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 11.
60 Brief for Respondent, supra note 40, at 2.
61 Id. at 2-3.
62 Id. at 3.
63

Id.
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student who was caught with the drugs and accused Savana of giving
them to her." Thus, prior to the strip search, the assistant principal
had no information regarding when Savana allegedly provided the
drugs or where, if Savana had them with her that day, she would
likely be hiding them.65
For two and a half hours following the search, Savana was forced
to sit outside an assistant principal's office alone, where she
witnessed Jordan and another student (Chris Clark), a police officer,
Marissa's father and the principal walk in and out of the office. 66 At
no time did school officials afford Savana the opportunity to call her
mother. 67 Savana finally told her mother about the strip search later
that day.68 During a meeting with the principal the following day, the
principal told Savana's mother not to worry because "the strip search
was [not] a big deal because they did not find anything." 69
Redding's mother filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of
Arizona, alleging that the search infringed upon Savana's Fourth
Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.70 The school
district and all other individually named defendants removed the case
to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and
moved for summary judgment, raising a qualified immunity defense
for each individual defendant. 7 1 In granting Safford's motion, the
district court held that the search complied with the two-prong
standard set forth in New Jersey v. T.L. 0., and that the school officials
therefore did not violate Savana's Fourth Amendment rights. 72 The
Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed.73
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel decision in a
similarly divided opinion. 74 Applying the two-pronged T.L.O.
standard, the court held that Wilson's search of Savana was
"unjustified at its inception,"7 unreasonable in scope,7 6 and therefore
in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The en banc majority
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009).
Id.
66 Brief for Respondent, supra note 40, at 5.
67 Id. at 7.
(
65

68 Id.
69

70
71

Id.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 28, at 11.
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).
Id. at 1077-78.
See Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 504 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir. 2007),
rev'd en banc, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
74 See Redding, 531 F.3d at 1089 (6-5 decision).
75 Id. at 1085.
72
73

76 Id. at 1087.

n Id.
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also held that Savana's rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident and that, as a result, Wilson was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court, however, affirmed summary judgment in
favor of Schwallier, the school nurse, and Romero, the administrative
assistant because they acted at Wilson's behest. 79 The school district
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted
certiorari.so
H. SCHOOL SEARCHES FROM T.L. 0. TO REDDING

In what now seems a much simpler time, the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment cases dealt with searches by police looking for
evidence to use in criminal prosecutions. Within that context, the
Supreme Court could exclaim that warrantless searches were "per se
unreasonable."81 That jurisprudence held that exceptions to the
warrant requirement are "few[,] specifically established[,] and well
delineated." 8 2 In the period before the all-out "war on drugs," these
exceptions to the warrant requirement were "jealously and carefully
drawn" 83 by the Court, and "justified by absolute necessity,"8 which
translated generally into real exigency.
In the period after application of the exclusionary rule to the
states85 and commencement of the "war on drugs," the Court's focus
on the warrant requirement and the requirement that exigency support
warrantless searches faded86 except in the context of home searches.8 7
78 See id. at 1088-89 ("[Tlhese notions of personal privacy are 'clearly established' in that
they inhere all of us, particularly middle school teenagers, and are inherent in the privacy
component of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." (quoting
Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008))).
79 Id. at 1089 ("[It is clear that the school nurse, Schwallier, and Wilson's assistant,
Romero, acted solely pursuant to Wilson's instructions and not as independent decision-makers,
and, thus, we affirm summary judgment as to them.").
8 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009).
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
82 Id.
83 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,499 (1958).
84 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) ("[T]here must be compelling
reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant. A search without a warrant demands
exceptional circumstances . . . .").
85 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a state court").
86See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985) (holding that a warrantless
search of a mobile home parked in a public lot was permitted under the automobile exception,
since a mobile home on a public street would be treated no differently than any other vehicle);
see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that police may search a
container placed in a car as part of the automobile exception).
87 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001). The Court noted:
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment cases became
much more catholic, involving more complex cases and exploring
Fourth Amendment rights in cases not limited to police searches for
evidence. In addition, the Supreme Court has carved out numerous
new exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement8 and,
in some of these exceptions, has eliminated the Fourth Amendment
standard of probable cause, opting for a lesser standard of cause or, in
some instances, even sanctioning intrusions without cause. 90
In New Jersey v. T.L O.,91 the Court upheld warrantless searches of
schoolchildren by teachers and administrators on the lesser standard
of "reasonable suspicion."92 After explaining why schoolchildren

We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws "a firm line at the entrance to the
house." That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright-which requires
clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant. While it is
certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that
occurred in this case that no "significant" compromise of the homeowner's privacy
has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment forward.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment is a guarantee against unreasonable home searches); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (noting that warrantless home searches are presumptively
unreasonable).
8 See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). Camara
held:
[A]dministrative searches [to confirm compliance with municipal ordinances] are
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that
such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and
that the reasons put forth in [prior cases] for upholding these warrantless searches are
insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's
protections.
Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a police officer may stop and
frisk a suspect on the street based on "reasonable suspicion"; a lesser threshold than probable
cause).
8 See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("In 1985, one commentator
cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions, including 'searches incident to arrest . . . automobile
searches ...

border searches ...

circumstances ...

administrative searches of regulated businesses ...

exigent

search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest ...

boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport

searches . . . school searchles] . . . .' (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985))).
9 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (holding that a blanket
policy subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches at any time does not violate the Fourth
Amendment); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random,
suspicionless drug testing of junior high school athletes); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (extending Veronia to all students participating
in extracurricular activities).
' 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
9 Id. at 333; cf Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Terry, Justice Douglas
expressed concern with the less demanding "reasonable suspicion" standard:
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need privacy protection in school, the Court recognized that a school
environment creates a "special circumstance" to excuse the warrant
requirement and allow a lesser standard of cause. 93 The Court based
its "special circumstance" finding on the school's need to maintain
order and a positive learning environment, and balanced this need
with the students' privacy interest.94
Reasonable suspicion was an odd choice to justify a full search of
a child and her possessions. The reasonable suspicion that supports a
Terry stop and frisk on the street by a police officer is not a search for
evidence, but rather only a limited pat-down search for weapons to
protect the officer's safety. Only after the suspicion deepens because
the officer feels an object that may be a weapon, may the officer even
reach into the suspect's clothing to retrieve that particular object. 9 6
T.L.O., however, sanctioned a full search of a child for evidence of a
crime or of a school-rule violation whenever a school official has
reasonable suspicion. In T.L.O., the Court held:
[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search. Determining the reasonableness of any search
involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether
the . . . action was justified at its inception," [and] second,
one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place."
Justice White, writing for the majority, continued:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
[school official] will be "justified at its inception" when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn

[Plolice officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without
warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the
constitutional standard of probable cause. At the time of their "seizure" without a
warrant they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have
satisfied a magistrate that "probable cause" was indeed present. The term "probable
cause" rings a bell of certainty that is not sounded by phrases such as "reasonable
suspicion."
Id.
9
9

T.LO., 469 U.S.at 340.
Id. at 339-40.

9 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
96See id. at 29-30.
9
9

See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
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up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either
the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction.99
The Court claimed the two-pronged standard would "neither unduly
burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their
schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
schoolchildren."1 "
Justice White's standard was opaque until distilled in Redding. As
originally written, the standard seemed to allow a full search, possibly
even a strip search, of a schoolchild based upon the minimal standard
of reasonable suspicion. After all, the general Fourth Amendment
principle is that a search supported by probable cause may extend to
any place where the sought object could be secreted. 101Moreover, in a
critical footnote in Justice White's majority opinion, the Court left
open "whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school
authorities."l 02 Justice White's vacillation on the issue of
individualized suspicion probably opened the door for courts to view
searches (or even strip searches) conducted on seemingly random
groups of students as no less reasonable than those conducted on a
student (or students) whom the school official has particularized
suspicion and evidence to target as the suspect of an investigation.
T.L.O. substituted reasonable suspicion for probable cause in the
school setting, and, as the dissenters noted, there was no reason to
believe that it was tinkering with the general principle governing the
scope of a search. Justice Brennan predicted that:
Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct
full-scale searches on a "reasonableness" standard whose
9 Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted).

1ood. at 342-43.
101See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The scope of a search is generally
defined by its expressed object."); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990)
("The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is defined by the object of the search
and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." (quoting United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982))); Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 ("A lawful search of fixed
premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found ...

102T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. The Court also noted that it was "unwilling to adopt a
standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's evaluation of the
relative importance of various school rules." Id. at 342 n.9.
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only definite content is that it is not the same test as the
"probable cause" standard found in the text of the Fourth
Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and
unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth
Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad
exception to standards that this Court has developed over
years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. 103
Moreover, Justice Stevens feared the standard set by the majority
would open a Pandora's box, allowing school administrators to search
students for any object school rules prohibited them from
possessing. 1" He also questioned whether the standard was strong
enough "to prohibit obviously unreasonable intrusions of young
adults' privacy .... " However, Justice Stevens did not think that
the authority granted in T.L.O. extended to strip searches. He
asserted:
One thing is clear under any standard-the shocking strip
searches that are described in some cases have no place in the
schoolhouse. To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are
ever reasonable outside the custodial context, it surely must
only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.106
Justice Stevens's caveat about strip searches may have reflected the
view of all the Justices, including those in the majority, or it may have
been just wishful thinking.
With T.L.O., the Court attempted to establish a standard that was
"at once, clear enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every
case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable
intrusions of young adults' privacy . . . ."1 7 Justice Stevens feared the
Court's standard was too broad and would turn the schoolhouse into a
police state. 08 Litigation involving school searches in the years
following TL.O. seemed to validate the fears of Justices Brennan and
Stevens.1'" The majority opinion was thus unsuccessful at guiding

03

1

Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

USee id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I fear that the concerns that motivated the
Court's activism have produced a holding that will permit school administrators to search
students suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for
behavior.").
I05
Id. at 381.
106
Id. at 382 n.25 (citations omitted).
1 Id. at 381.
1"See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"9See infra notes 113, 120, 128, 138 and accompanying text.
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both lower courts and school administrators,' 10 in part, because it
failed to stress its analysis of the facts under the two-pronged
standard, including the two separate searches (one for cigarettes and
one for marijuana) and the existence of additional information to
support the factual predicate underlying the second search for
marijuana." Not surprisingly, lower federal courts applying T.L.O. to
strip searches failed to grasp the T.L 0. process.
The early strip-search cases following T.L.O. resulted in qualified
immunity for teachers and administrators. Some of those casesespecially those involving strip searches for small amounts of missing
money-were patently outrageous, yet none of the courts referenced
Justice Stevens' certainty that the T.LO. rules pertaining to searches
of schoolchildren were never intended to apply to strip searches.
Moreover, federal circuit court decisions generally upheld the strip
searches, or, more often, concluded that the searches were illegal but
granted qualified immunity.112
1 13
for example,
In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District,
teachers performed strip searches on both boys and girls in their
10 See Bill 0. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, 1999
BYU Educ. & L.J. 71, 103-04 ("Under the new criteria [the Court set forth in T.LO.], a
mistaken observation or a faulty report could still be reasonable grounds to conduct a search if
the circumstances were convincing. Without the requirement of either probable cause and with
only a reference to 'reasonable scope' to substitute for individualized suspicion, broad and
random searches could be upheld based on little more than a perception of a serious but general
problem which might be effectively regulated by general searches.").
II T.L 0., 469 U.S. at 343-47. The case arose from the following facts. A faculty member
caught T.L.O. smoking in the restroom in violation of school rules. Id. at 345. Because T.L.O.
denied she had been smoking, school officials searched her purse for cigarettes. Id. at 345-46.
The Court held that T.L.O.'s denial provided the officials with reasonable suspicion to search
her purse. Id. at 346. In the course of that search, the school principal discovered rolling papers,
indicating potential possession or distribution of marijuana. Id. at 347. This discovery prompted
the principal to continue rifling through T.L.O.'s purse in search of contraband. Id. The Court
held:
The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when
[the principal] observed a package of rolling papers . . . [which] gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her
purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.'s purse, which turned up
more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags ... a small
quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered
compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index
card containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two letters, the
inference that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough
to justify [the principal] in examining the letters to determine whether they contained
any further evidence.
Id.
112See

Heder, supra note 110, at 104-06; see also infra notes 119-42 and accompanying

text.
113402 F.3d

598 (6th Cir. 2005).
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respective locker rooms to recover a student's money that had
disappeared during a gym class. 1 14 Teachers started with the boys,
searching each of them individually in the locker room shower. 15
Each boy had to lower his pants and underwear and remove his
shirt.1 16 A police officer, who arrived after about half of the boys had
been searched, encouraged the teachers to continue searching the
students, stating that teachers "ha[ve] 'a lot more leeway' than police
officers when it [comes] to searching students."' 17 Later, teachers
searched the girls in the same manner.'18 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the actions of the school personnel
to have violated the Fourth Amendment, but reversed the district
court's denial of qualified immunity.119
In Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education,120
two eight-year-old girls were implicated in the theft of seven dollars
from one of their classmates. 12 1 After an initial search of the girls'
backpacks, shoes, and socks turned up nothing, their teacher
accompanied them to the restroom where she told the girls to enter
the stalls and come out with their underwear around their ankles.122
After the strip search turned up nothing, the teacher escorted the girls
to the principal's office for questioning. 12 3 Before the ordeal was
over, the girls were ordered to remove their clothing once more
before they were allowed to return to class.124 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, because
the girls in this case were so young, they were less likely to be
personally impacted by a strip search, and they therefore had a
diminished need for privacy. 125 The court then concluded that "at the
time these events took place, the law pertaining to the application of
the Fourth Amendment to the search of students at school had not
been developed in a concrete, factually similar context to the extent
"4Id. at 601.
115Id.
116Id

117

Id.

18

I Id. at 602.
119

Id. ("The searches performed on the students in this case were unconstitutional.
However, at the time the searches were performed, the law did not clearly establish that the
searches were unconstitutional under these circumstances. The denial of summary judgment is
accordingly reversed.").
120 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).
121 See id. at 822.
122 Id
23

1

1Id.at 822-23.
d. at 823.

4
12
25

1 See id. at 827 n.5 (noting that "it is a matter of common experience that teachers
frequently assist students of that age in the bathroom, e.g., in the event of an accidental
wetting").
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that educators were on notice that their conduct was constitutionally
impermissible."l 26 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit granted the
defendants qualified immunity.127
In Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consolidated High School District
No. 230,128 Brian Cornfield, a sixteen-year-old student in a behavioral
disorder program, was strip-searched by his teacher and a school
administrator who suspected Cornfield was concealing drugs in the
crotch of his pants. 129 School officials became suspicious of Cornfield
when a teacher's aide noticed that Cornfield was "too well-endowed,"
suggesting that the student "was 'crotching' drugs."130 The teacher's
aide informed Cornfield's teacher and the dean of the school, and two
other women (another teacher and another teacher's aide) confirmed
to the dean that Cornfield was, indeed, "too well-endowed." 3
Information obtained by the dean from third parties, including a
student's report that Cornfield had previously brought drugs onto
campus, supplemented the dean's own observations.132 There were
also reports from a teacher that Cornfield had dealt drugs in the past,
as well as additional reports from third parties, one of which
suggested that Cornfield had "crotched" drugs during a police raid at
his mother's home. 133 On top of the independent tips from teachers
and fellow students, local police reported to the school that they had
received information that Cornfield was dealing drugs to other
students. 134 Though the initial suspicion leading to the search of
Cornfield may have been based on, inter alia, the curiosity of a young
female teacher, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the dean did not violate Cornfield's Fourth
Amendment rights when he asked Cornfield to strip. 13 5 The
corroborating information from other teachers, students, and the
police provided Cornfield's teacher and dean with sufficient
information to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Cornfield could
be hiding drugs in the crotch of his pants-a suspicion that proved

2

1 6 Id. at 828.
127 Id.
128

991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1993).

129d. at 1319.

'0Id.

131 Id.

132 Id.
'33Id. at 1322.
34

1
35
1

See id.
See id. at 1322-23.
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wrong.136 As a result, the Seventh Circuit granted the teacher and
dean qualified immunity.137
3
school officials received a
Finally, in Phaneuf v. Fraiken,'
student tip that Phaneuf, an eighteen-year-old student with a history
of disciplinary problems, was planning to stuff marijuana down her
pants for use at a class picnic. 13 9 The school officials, relying on
"(1) the tip from a fellow student, (2) Phaneuf's past disciplinary
problems, (3) the suspicious manner of her denial, and (4) the
discovery of cigarettes in her purse,""4 called Phaneuf s mother in to
conduct a strip search because the tip indicated that the drugs were
allegedly hidden where only a strip search would discover them. 14 1
Though the circumstances in Phaneufweighed heavily in favor of the
school district, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 142
Reconsideration of Phaneuf following the decision in Redding may
lead to the conclusion that the search was, in fact, legal under the new
standards.
In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the Court
transformed the T.L.O. standard, stating that reasonable suspicion is a
sliding scale.14 3 The greater the intrusion on the child's privacy, the
more factual support is needed to justify the intrusion by teachers or
administrators. 14 Redding stressed that T.L. 0. set forth a two-pronged
test for determining the reasonableness of a school search, and
provides much needed clarification of the reasonable suspicion
standard originally articulated in T.L.O. Moreover, the Court's
exposition of reasonable suspicion in the school setting may impact
other searches where reasonable suspicion serves as the standard.
III. REDDING RESCUES T.L. 0., BUT NOT ENTIRELY
Redding was Justice David Souter's valedictory opinion. In
keeping with his style, he wrote the opinion modestly-as it turns out,
perhaps too modestly. Justice Souter claimed that the opinion merely

136 See id. at 1323 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
and dean).
teacher
1 37

See id. at 1323-28.

138

448 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2006).

139
Id. at 593.

140d. at 597.
141See

id. at 594.
See id. at 600 (holding that the search was not sufficiently justified at its inception, and
remanding for further consideration of the applicability of qualified immunity).
143 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642-43 (2009).
42

1

]44Id.
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restates the law in T.L.O.,145 but it does much more and, despite
Justice Souter's modesty, will have lasting effects that extend well
beyond the subject of school strip searches. The Court rescued the
reasonable suspicion standard from the amorphous statement that
emerged from Terry v. Ohio, which has often justified
Terry-intrusions on baseless hunches."' 6 Its exposition on reasonable
suspicion should therefore impact all applications of the reasonable
suspicion standard.
Redding also explained that the T.L.O. analysis applies to all
school searches.' 47 These standards were not obvious from Justice
White's 1985 opinion. The Court, however, failed to definitively
articulate the technical threshold of a strip search, a defect that may
well lead to future litigation in this area. Even so, the Court made
clear that a strip search of a student is an extraordinary intrusion that,
while available in the arsenal of school tools, ought to be used only
for the most serious of matters and reserved for searches to uncover
items that could cause serious harm to students. 148
A. Reasonable Suspicion Has Been an Ambiguous Standard
In Redding, Justice Souter noted that both T.LO. and subsequent
decisions applying it use "a standard of reasonable suspicion to
determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a student .
... "149 Further, he reiterated T.L. 0., stating that "a school search 'will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction."', 50 The Court, however, went far beyond merely echoing
the T.LO. standard. Justice Souter provided some teeth to the
reasonable suspicion standard by comparing it to probable cause.
Probable cause, he said, requires a "fair probability" or a "substantial
chance" of discovering evidence of criminal activity, while
reasonable suspicion requires only "a moderate chance of finding
evidence of wrongdoing."1 5 1 That little kernel-"a moderate

145Id.
146See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968) (permitting the police to exercise a brief
seizure of a person for investigative purposes where there are facts and circumstances (as
opposed to inarticulate hunches) giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the suspect has
committed or is about to commit a crime).
47
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
'4 Id. at 2643.

1

at 2639 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.0, 469 U.S. 325, 342, 345 (1985)).
o50
Id. (quoting T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342).

1'Id.

1sId.
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chance"-is probably more substantive guidance than the Supreme
Court has ever offered on reasonable suspicion.
The doctrine of "reasonable suspicion" emerged in Terry as a
lesser predicate standard than probable cause, a standard intended to
govern brief street seizures that fall short of full arrests. 152 Such
intrusions, which constitute a restraint on a citizen's freedom to walk
away, implicate a person's right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.15 A Terry stop, while less than an arrest, involves police
compulsion to the extent that a reasonable person would not feel free
to ignore the police request and walk away. 154 When the necessary
155
compulsion exists and the person complies with the police demand,
156
that stop must be supported by "reasonable suspicion."
The reasonableness of the intrusion is determined "by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails."1 57 When "justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
"Anything less would invite
reasonably warrant that intrusion.
intrusions . . . based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate

hunches[.]" 1 5 9 The intrusion must be objectively evaluated and subject
"to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate
the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances."160 Reasonable suspicion must be based
upon the totality of the circumstances. 161 Chief Justice Warren offered
52

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-25 (1968).
See id.
15
See id. at 19 n.16 ("Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure'
has occurred."); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("So long as a reasonable
person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business,' the encounter is
consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." (citation omitted)).
155See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) ("The word 'seizure' readily
bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement,
even when it is ultimately unsuccessful. . . . It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect
of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee.").
'5 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
7
' Id. at 21 (alterations in original) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523, 537 (1967)).
1

153

158

Id.

15Id. at 22.
MId. at 21-22 ("[It is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?").
16 1
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see also United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (holding that lower court erred in considering the facts in
isolation from each other when deciding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct
a traffic stop).
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no clue to lower courts evaluating an officer's decision to make a
forcible stop as to how to measure the likelihood that a crime is about
to be committed or has been committed. After all, the facts in Terry
were bare (although overstated in Warren's opinionl 62), and the
seizures were powered by the officer's judgment (or hunch) that the
suspects were up to no good. 163 Thus, Terry, itself, stood for the
proposition that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was not very
substantial.
The softness of the reasonable suspicion standard was even
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop
a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded
suspicion" are not self-defining; they fall short of providing
clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that
arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the
totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be
taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal

activity.164
However, the Cortez Court did little to help clarify the standard by
emphasizing that a court's determination of the reasonableness of a
stop must take into consideration the inferences and deductions drawn
by a trained law enforcement officer, "inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person."1 65 Nonetheless, the reviewing
court must make an independent judgment about the legality of the
seizure: whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer just
prior to the seizure, along with the reasonable inferences and
deductions drawn by the police officer, rose to the level of reasonable
suspicion. 16 6 The reviewing court is not supposed to be a rubber
stamp for police discretion. Yet, too often it becomes a rubber stamp
when inferences drawn from very meager facts are bolstered by
factors such as time of day and locale-often proxies for race-

62

See Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423,
430-32 (2004).
163See id. at 429 (arguing that the Court in Terry "failed to achieve its stated purpose of
tying the [stop-and-frisk] practice to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard").
164
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
65
' Id. at 418.
1
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
1
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allowing for seizures in one context that a court would simply not
countenance in other contexts.
B. Probabilities
Justice Souter's opinion in Redding attempts to put flesh on the
reasonable suspicion standard. For the first time, the Supreme Court
discussed reasonable suspicion in the language of probabilities. We
are accustomed to the Supreme Court discussing, albeit generally,
probable cause in terms of probabilities-but never reasonable
suspicion. Quoting Illinois v. Gates,167 Justice Souter points out that
probable cause requires the facts supporting issuance of a search
warrant, or an officer's decision to search without a warrant, to rise to
a "fair probability" or a "'substantial chance' of discovering evidence
of criminal activity." 16 8 In contrast, Justice Souter says that "[t]he
lesser standard [of reasonable suspicion] for school searches could as
readily be described as a moderate chance of finding evidence of

wrongdoing." 16 9
We do not suggest that Justice Souter's "moderate chance of
finding evidence of wrongdoing" language clothes the reasonable
suspicion inquiry in an easily transferable standard that will be readily
understood and applied similarly by all judges. On the other hand,
"moderate chance" does provide the beginnings of a benchmark
where none existed before. The application of the standard to the
school's decision to strip-search Savana Redding demonstrates not
only that it has substance, but also that it is not intended as a
makeweight that effectively hides total deferral to unfettered
discretion of school administrators.
Even though the opinion and standard were crafted in response to a
school strip search, the Court's general statements about reasonable
suspicion appear equally applicable to a review of reasonable
suspicion in a criminal case, adding substance to the standard where
there historically has not been any. A court need not add a percentage
of likely success to "moderate chance" for it to have a braking effect
upon police discretion. While it might seem unusual for the Court to
use a civil action arising out of a school search to transform and add
substance to a term usually used in the context of a criminal case, the
principles announced in the majority opinion apply to reasonable
suspicion, rather than simply to the school search context. Redding
167462 U.S. 213 (1983).
68 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (citations
omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983)).
16 Id.
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could signal an upcoming reconsideration of reasonable suspicion in
all contexts, as well as a willingness to stop deferring entirely to
police judgments. Such a wholesale reconsideration of reasonable
suspicion, however, could be slowed by the recent retirement of
Justice Souter.
C. Reasonable Suspicion Is a Sliding Scale
The Redding majority clarified the T.L.O. standard governing the
scope of a school search. Justice Souter recognized that reasonable
suspicion in the context of school searches is a sliding scale, and that
the factual predicate to support a strip search must be greater than that
needed to support a less intrusive search. The search must be
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."170 The Court concluded that "the
content of the suspicion [that Savana Redding possessed drugs] failed
to match the degree of the intrusion [a strip search]." 71
The Court in Redding found the sliding scale implicit in the T.L.O.
Court's application of the two-pronged standard to the facts of the
earlier case. The T.L.O. Court determined that school officials had
subjected T.L.O. to two distinct searches and concluded that the
school principal in T.L.O. had a greater factual basis for reasonable
suspicion to justify the second, more intrusive search of T.L.O.'s
purse.17 2 The Redding Court was not the first judicial body to find the
sliding scale implicit in T.L. 0.173 Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion
should provide much needed guidance to lower courts and, more
importantly, to school teachers and administrators.
The Redding analysis treats reasonable suspicion as an imperfect
arithmetic formula, rather than an amorphous, meaningless phrase
prone to subjective judicial and administrative interpretation. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court recognizes the seriousness of the
intrusion and concludes that the school had insufficient facts to justify
a strip search because of (1) "the nature and limited threat" of the
objects sought and (2) the absence of any information to suspect that
the objects sought were, at the time of the search, on the child's
7

o Id. at
0

71

Id.
72

2642 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).

See T.L 0., 469 U.S. at 347.
173Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have acknowledged T.LO.'s sliding scale. See
Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Although T.LO. held that reasonable
suspicion is the governing standard, the reasonableness of the suspicion is informed by the very
intrusive nature of a strip search, requiring for its justification a high level of suspicion."
(citation omitted)); Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.
1993) ("[A] highly intrusive search in response to a minor infraction would ... not comport
with the sliding scale advocated by the Supreme Court in T.LO.").
1
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person or hidden in her underwear. 17 4 Recognition of a sliding scale
would allow for a more intrusive search in some cases than was
allowed in this case. If the search was for dangerous, as opposed to
nondangerous, contraband, a lesser factual predicate might suffice.175
Redding also modified the scope of a search conducted pursuant to
reasonable suspicion. A search based on probable cause allows for a
complete search of a person or object-even a strip search-because
the scope of the search extends to any place where the object sought
could be hidden.17 6 In the schoolhouse, the lower standard of
reasonable suspicion is substituted for probable cause because of the
special need to ensure a safe learning environment. 177 It does not
necessarily follow, however, that a search on a lower standard of
suspicion in a school automatically supports as extensive a search as
would be allowed on probable cause. The scope of the search will be
limited by the nature of the object sought and the factual predicate
supporting the search. 17 8 Reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search
after Redding is not the same as reasonable suspicion to justify a
search of a child's outer clothing or her possessions. There must be a
factual basis to conduct the greater, more intrusive search, and there
must be reasonable cause to believe the object is where the searcher
wants to look. This limitation is a fair inference from T.L.O., but one
the Court never fully developed in the original decision, perhaps
because the search was only of T.L.O.'s purse.17 9 It is also possible
that Justice White never contemplated that the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion would be used to justify a strip search, though it
was certainly a fear held by Justice Stevens.iso

74

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
id. (noting that the absence of any indication that the alleged drugs were dangerous
to students made the more intrusive search unreasonable).
76
1 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) ("A lawful search of fixed
premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and
is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to
complete the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal
weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the
weapon might be found." (footnote omitted)); see also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991) (holding that a suspect's consent to a search of his car for contraband included consent to
examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car because the contraband could have been
hidden in that bag). The Court generalized this principle by stating that "[tihe scope of a search
is generally defined by its expressed object." Id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824).
" See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341.
78
1 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
79
' See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 347.
1soSee id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("One thing is
clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no
place in the schoolhouse.").
1
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D. Redding Failsto Articulate the Threshold of a Strip Search
The eight Justices in the Redding majority failed to resolve
once and for all what constitutes a strip search. The majority stumbled
to the conclusion that the search of Savana Redding was a strip
search, since she was required to "remove her clothes down to her
underwear and then 'pull out' her bra and the elastic band on her
underpants."18' The Court said that it did not want to define strip
search in a way that guarantees litigation "about who was looking and
how much was seen. ,,182 Nonetheless, the critical fact leading to the
Court's conclusion that a strip search took place was "[t]he very fact
of Savana's pulling her underwear away from her body in the
presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily
exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree.. .. 183 Thus, the
critical fact that established a strip search in Redding seems to be that
Savana's breasts and genital area were exposed to view.'84 Only
Justice Thomas thought that the term, and thus the stricter rules
governing strip searches, should be reserved for cases of total
nudity.' 85 Justice Thomas, however, based his definition on case law
that was entirely divorced from the school search context. 86
One remarkable aspect of the majority's conclusion is that it will
do exactly what the Court hoped it would not: guarantee further
litigation. Justice Souter's opinion fails to distinguish between a
search that requires a child to strip to her underwear and a search that
involves some exposure of breasts and genitalia. It is impossible to
conclude whether Justice Souter limited the stricter standard
enunciated in Redding to just the latter, or whether it includes any
search that requires a child to strip to her underwear. This uncertainty
181
Redding, 129

S. Ct. at 2641.
Id.
is3 Id.
18See id. ("[S]ubjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support
the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of
justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
belongings.").
id. at 2649 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185
86 See
' See id. Justice Thomas based his opposition to such a definition on cases that are
inapplicable to the circumstances surrounding Redding: Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475
(1995), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 & n.39 (1979). Both cases involved searches
acknowledged by the Court as more intrusive than a general strip search. In Sandin, the Court
implied that the rectal search of a prison inmate by corrections officers went beyond the scope
of the traditional strip search. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. The Court in Wolfish described a
cavity inspection as "part of a strip search," meaning simply that when a cavity inspection is
performed, the person being searched has, by definition, already stripped nude, and thus the
more intrusive cavity search becomes an additional part of a strip search. See Wolfish, 441 U.S.
at 558. The statement does not indicate that a strip search has not occurred without a cavity
search.
1
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foreshadows additional litigation, notwithstanding the Court's
intention to provide adequate guidance to eliminate litigation on this
issue.
While the Redding Court may have intended to subscribe to this
broader definition, its discussion of the issue was far from clear. In
that regard, the opinion fails to provide clear guidance for those trying
to determine the parameters of a school search. Moreover, even the
broader rule, defining a strip search as any situation in which a child
is forced to expose his or her underwear, leaves some room for
maneuvering.1
The broader definition also leaves some questions regarding
whether the threshold test might differ depending upon the age and
gender of the student searched. The T.L.O. Court said that the
appropriateness of a school search depends upon the age and gender
of the student.188 Clearly, the broader definition applies any time a
female student is required to remove her shirt and expose her bra.
Even though boys may be less sensitive to exposing their upper
bodies during a search, a rule distinguishing boys and girls could be
problematic,189 and any generality that provides less protection to a
boy than a girl would fail to take into consideration a particular male
student's sensitivity to his body image.
Nonetheless, searches of male students are less cut-and-dry.
Obviously, asking a boy to remove his shirt, and even his undershirt,
exposing the upper half of his body usually does not implicate the
same sensitivity and privacy concerns implicated if a girl is asked to
expose the upper half of her body. However, courts will have to
define what a strip search is for a boy and determine whether a boy is
entitled to less protection. Clearly, school officials cannot ask a male
87

The First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted this definition. See Wood v.
Hancock County Sheriff's Dep't, 354 F.3d 57, 63 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003) (recognizing that "a strip
search may occur even when [the subject] is not fully disrobed"); Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d
356, 363 (4th Cir. 2001) (adopting a prior court's determination that the act of pulling down a
suspect's trousers, but not his boxer shorts, was a strip search) (citing United States v. Dorlouis,
107 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir. 1997)); Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 190 (11th
Cir. 1992) (finding that a strip search occurred when police stripped the subject to her
underwear).
88
' See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (noting that a school search "will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction").
189Cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) ("[A] party seeking to uphold
government [discrimination] based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the classification . . . [by showing] 'at least that the classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
1
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student to remove his pants under the broader definition if doing so
would expose his underwear to the view of those conducting the
search. Some may argue that the threshold should permit school
officials to ask a male student to remove his shirt because the image
of a shirtless male (regardless of age) is socially acceptable. Whether
this would constitute an impermissible double standard is uncertain
because even though there are many contexts in which a young boy or
a man would appear shirtless-even in gym classes where students
playing basketball play shirts against skins-those contexts never
include a visual inspection of the male student's exposed body under
circumstances that can be both intimidating and humiliating.190
Common sense dictates that we establish rules that vary somewhat
for boys and girls. Redding's strict standard for cause therefore should
define a "strip search" as any search of a girl that requires her to strip
to her bra and underwear or that requires a boy to strip to his
undershorts. Requiring a child to remove his or her outer clothing to
the underwear is qualitatively different than the search of a child's
outer clothing, which the Court recognized. 191 Coupled with the
Redding Court's rule that a strip search must be supported by
individualized, particularized suspicion, 19 2 strip searches will be
conducted individually and privately, and students will not be
humiliated by being forced to strip in front of other students.19 3
Moreover, such a strict definition helps strike an important balance
between personal privacy and school safety. The standard advocated
'See

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. As the Court noted:

Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search is responding to an
accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading
that a number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never
reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be ....
Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.79.070(1) (West 2002) (defining a strip search as
"having a person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit an
inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, or undergarments of the person or breasts of a female
person").
91
1 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
i9 See id. at 2643.
1 See, e.g., Thomas ex reL Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003) (reinstating
Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953
(2002)). In Thomas, an envelope containing $26 disappeared from a teacher's desk. 261 F.3d at
1163. After none of the students admitted to having taken the envelope, the vice principal
authorized the school's DARE officer to conduct a search of the children in order to locate the
missing money. Id. The teacher accompanied the girls to the restroom, and the officer did the
same with the boys. Id. at 1164. Once in the restroom, the officer pulled his pants and
underwear down to his ankles to demonstrate what he wanted the boys to do. Id. All of the boys
dropped their pants, and some dropped their underwear as well, all in full view of each other and
anyone walking by the open restroom door. Id. The teacher searched the girls similarly, though
she kept the groups to between two and five students. Id. The envelope was not located as a
result of the searches. Id.
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here protects both the constitutional rights and personal privacy of
prepubescent and adolescent students, while providing school
officials with enough investigative flexibility to utilize searches
beyond a pat-down of the suspect's outer clothing when looking for
dangerous contraband.
E. A Strip Search Is an ExtraordinaryIntrusion, Reserved Only for
the Most Serious Circumstances
A strip search is an extreme intrusion into the privacy of an
individual and must be reserved for the most serious of
circumstances. 19 4 The Supreme Court rejected the strip search in
Redding without entirely removing it from the arsenal of investigative
tools that school officials possess. 95 The Court put a strip search in its
own class, demanding its own specific set of suspicions.196 Without a
doubt, Wilson had a right to investigate Savana Redding based on the
tip he received from Marissa Glines.197 However, Wilson's
substandard investigation failed to provide him with enough
reasonable suspicion to justify subjecting Redding to the more
intrusive strip search.' 98 Therefore, Wilson's actions were unjustified
at their inception and excessively intrusive in scope.' 99
Wilson's initial investigation of Savana satisfied the two-pronged
T.L.O. standard. The Court first determined that Wilson had enough
suspicion to "justify a search of Savana's backpack and outer
clothing." 200 Moreover, Wilson's initial actions were reasonable in
1
9 See, e.g., Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[A] strip search,
regardless how professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating
experience.").
95
1 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
16Id. at 2463 ("The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may
reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific
suspicions.").
17See id. at 2641.
19
8See id. at 2642-43.
1
99Id. at 2642 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
200Id. at 2641. As the Court noted:

Wilson called Savana into his office and showed her the day planner. Their
conversation established that Savana and Marissa were on friendly terms: while she
denied knowledge of the contraband, Savana admitted that the day planner was hers
and that she had lent it to Marissa. Wilson had other reports of their friendship from
staff members, who had identified Savana and Marissa as part of an unusually rowdy
group at the school's opening dance in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes
were found in the girls' bathroom. Wilson had reason to connect the girls with this
contraband, for Wilson knew that Jordan Romero had told the principal that before
the dance, he had been at a party at Savana's house where alcohol was served.
Marissa's statement that the pills came from Savana was thus sufficiently plausible
to warrant suspicion that Savana was involved in pill distribution.
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scope: "the look into Savana's bag, in her presence and in the relative
privacy of Wilson's office, was not excessively intrusive, any more
than Romero's subsequent search of her outer clothing." 20 1
Wilson's unsatisfactory investigation, however, failed to generate
adequate suspicion to justify any further intrusion. The Court stated
unequivocally that officials should reserve strip searches for only the
most serious of circumstances. 202 Redding's strip search was
unjustified because "the content of the suspicion failed to match the
degree of intrusion." 203 Had Wilson been unsure of the drug Savana
allegedly possessed, had he feared that it was a dangerous substance,
or had any of the student tips indicated Savana was hiding pills in her
underwear, the more intrusive strip search may have been justified. 204
Thus, Wilson's strip search of Savana Redding was unreasonable in
scope because Wilson did not adopt measures reasonably related to
the objectives of his search.205
The procedures Wilson initiated were not thought through in
advance. There was no regimen in place. The school was prepared to
do the same thing whether the suspected drug was aspirin or a

Id. at 2640-41.
201 Id. at 2641.
202Id. ("[B]oth subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support
the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of
justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and
belongings.").
203Id. at 2642. The Court reasoned:
Wilson knew beforehand that the pills were prescription-strength ibuprofen and
over-the-counter naproxen, common pain relievers .... He must have been aware of
the nature and limited threat of the specific drugs he was searching for, and while
just about anything can be taken in quantities that will do real harm, Wilson had no
reason to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that
individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.

Id.
204See

id. at 2642-43. Justice Souter put it this way:

In sum, what was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana was
any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity,
and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear. We think
that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.

Id.
205Id at

2642. As the Court stated:

[N)ondangerous school contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate
places, and there is no evidence in the record of any general practice among Safford
Middle School students of hiding that sort of thing in underwear; neither Jordan nor
Marissa suggested to Wilson that Savana was doing that, and the preceding search of
Marissa that Wilson ordered yielded nothing.

Id.
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dangerous substance. Nor was there any attempt to learn how recently
Savana had possessed the substance or where on her person she was
likely to hide it. The school's procedure was totally devoid of any
sense of proportionality.
IV. REDDING WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE CASE FOR QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Qualified immunity developed through the common law as a
protection for government officials performing discretionary
functions.2% It is available as a defense to damage claims asserted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against government officials in their
individual capacities.207 A school official searching a student is
"entitled to qualified immunity where clearly established law does not
show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." 2 08 For the right
to be "clearly established," the "contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right." 20 9 However, "there is no need
that 'the very action in question [have] previously been held
unlawful," 21 0 and the facts of the previous case neither have to be
"fundamentally similar" nor "materially similar" to a case at issue in
order to find that the law had been "clearly established." 211 Thus,
"officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established
law even in novel factual circumstances."2 12
Six Justices in the Redding majority granted qualified immunity to
the school officials.2 13 Justice Souter wrote that, because lower courts
206PrivateParty Immunity from Section 1983 Suits, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (2010)
("[Tlhe Supreme Court has afforded government officials qualified or absolute immunity if
there was a "tradition of immunity ... so firmly rooted in the common law and ... supported by
such strong policy reasons" that Congress would not have silently abolished it upon § 1983's
adoption in 1871." (quoting Wyatt v. Cole 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992)).
2
o7See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
20
8Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
20 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
210
See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 615 (1999)); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (noting that "[tihe contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right," but asserting that the action in question need not have been explicitly held
unlawful-its unlawfulness simply must have been apparent "in the light of pre-existing law").
211See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
212 Id.
21

3

See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented from the grant
of qualified immunity to the school officials. See id. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg also wrote separately to emphasize her objection to
Wilson's abusive and unreasonable treatment of Redding and her resulting opposition to the
Court's grant of qualified immunity. See id. at 2645-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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have applied the T.L.O. standard inconsistently to school searches, the
law was sufficiently unclear.2 14 Though varying interpretations of the
law in the lower courts by no means guarantee a litigant qualified
immunity, Justice Souter reasoned that dissenting opinions in
strip-search cases in these courts provided enough well-reasoned,
valid interpretations of strip search policy for the Court to determine
that T.LO. was ambiguous.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, however, would not have granted
the Safford officials qualified immunity.216 As mentioned above,
Justice Stevens, even as a T.L.O. dissenter, never believed the Court
intended the two-pronged T.L.O. standard to apply to strip searches.217
Thus, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg concurred with the
majority's conclusion that Savana's strip search went beyond the
scope of reasonableness, they would have affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's decision to deny qualified immunity. 218 In their eyes, the
clarity of the law should not depend on a lower court's
misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent.2 19 Justice Stevens
argued that Wilson and the other Safford officials were dealing with
circumstances that already had a developed body of Supreme Court
case law, rather than a situation with future constitutional
214Id. at 2643-44 ("[W]e realize that the lower courts have reached divergent conclusions
regarding how the T.LO. standard applies to [school] searches. . . . Mhese differences of
opinion from our own are substantial enough to require immunity for the school officials in this
case.").
215Id at 2644. The Court asserted:

We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the guaranteed
product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the
fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a
right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear. That said,
however, the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see
them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to
counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.

Id.

216
See id. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.25 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude
search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude."
(quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980))).
218
See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). 2 19
See id. at 2645. Justice Stevens explained:
[The clarity of a well-established right should not depend on whether jurists have
misread our precedents. And while our cases have previously noted the "divergence
of views" among courts in deciding whether to extend qualified immunity, we have
relied on that consideration only to spare officials from having "to predict the future
course of constitutional law. . .
Id. (citations omitted).
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considerations, and they were therefore not entitled to the shield of
qualified immunity.220 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's
opinion, but wrote separately to assert that Wilson abused his power
during the entire course of his substandard investigation.22 1
Classifying Wilson's actions as abuse was bold and correct, but
Justice Ginsburg should have expanded upon her conclusion. The
Court should not have granted Wilson qualified immunity because his
actions defied the realm of common sense one would associate with a
seasoned school administrator. While school administrators are
generally not well versed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or the
ideological back and forth that lower courts have engaged in
regarding the T.LO. doctrine, one would expect an experienced
school administrator to conduct, at the very least, a consistent
investigation of all students allegedly involved in a given situation. 222
Wilson's ignorance of the law would be plausible for a qualified
immunity defense-even palatable-if he had conducted his
investigation and searches intelligently and consistently. Without any
semblance of uniformity, however, the grant of qualified immunity
seems an untenable result.
Wilson ordered searches of at least three students.223 The record
reveals very little about Chris Clark's involvement in the
investigation-other than Redding's averments that he was only
required to shake out his shirt and empty his pockets 224-but we need
only look at the differences between the searches Wilson ordered of
Savana and Marissa. Wilson ordered Schwallier, the school nurse, to
conduct individual searches of each girl, but Marissa was subjected to
a less intrusive search, even though that very day Wilson discovered
220
See id. ("[W]e chart no new constitutional path. We merely decide whether the decision
to strip search Savana Redding, on these facts, was prohibited under T.L 0.").
221 See id. at 2645-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice
Ginsburg explained:

Wilson did not release Redding, to return to class or to go home, after the search.
Instead, he made her sit on a chair outside his office for over two hours. At no point
did he attempt to call her parent. Abuse of authority of that order should not be
shielded by official immunity.... Wilson's treatment of Redding was abusive and it
was not reasonable for him to believe that the law permitted it.
Id.
222 See, e.g., Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2005). The
police officer involved in Beard informed the teacher conducting the search that "the teachers
needed to check the girls in the same way [as the boys] so as to prevent any claims of gender
discrimination." Id.
22
3 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 40, at 5 ("[S]chool officials searched Chris
[Clark] later that morning by asking him to empty his pockets and shake out his shirt and pants;
they did not ask Chris to remove any of his clothing.").
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pills in her possession. Marissa was not forced to pull her bra and
panties aside, and none of Marissa's private areas were exposed, as
was the case in the search of Savana.226 Moreover, Wilson never
permitted Savana to call her mother before or after the ordeal,
although Marissa's father eventually came to the school. 22 7 Most
chilling, however, is that Wilson honestly believed he did nothing
wrong by conducting two different searches because, as he told
Savana's mother, the search of Savana turned up nothing and Savana
228
faced no disciplinary action.
Clearly, Wilson was not acting as if he were following any
established protocol. Rather, Wilson conducted a haphazard,
off-the-cuff investigation with little to no understanding of how his
actions would affect the parties involved. A school administrator who
acts in such an egregiously reckless manner should not be entitled to
qualified immunity, even if the law is not "clearly established." Even
before Redding, the law of T.L.O. was sufficiently clear that the
reasonableness of a student search depended on the scope of the
search.229 Moreover, T.L.O. made clear that the more intrusive the
search, the clearer the justification must be. 2 30 Here, Wilson's ad hoc,
disparate search methods should have precluded his qualified
immunity, as his search methods were based on neither facts nor
logic.
Redding instructs us that a school's strip search will be subject to a
close analysis of its Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The Court
failed to follow through in a logical analysis, which would require, as
an initial prerequisite to a grant of qualified immunity, that the school
district anticipate such incidents and adopt a policy governing strip
searches. Absent such a policy, the procedures will, as in Redding,
always be ad hoc and not subject to advance planning, giving rise to
further outrages. Absent a preexisting policy, qualified immunity
should not even be on the table. Taking immunity from money
damages out of these lawsuits will likely have a greater effect on
school boards and administrators than any other aspect of the Redding
decision.
225

See id. at 4-5.
Compare id. at 2-3 (observing that Romero and Schwallier directed Savana to remove
her pants and shirt, pull out her panties and bra, and move them to the side), with id. at 4-5
(noting that while "Romero, aided by Schwallier, asked Marissa to remove her socks and shoes,
raise up her shirt and pull out the band of her bra, take off her pants, and stretch the elastic on
her underwear," they did not ask Marissa to take off her shirt).
7
See id. at 5.
228
Id. at 7.
22 9
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
23
0 Id.
2 26
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CONCLUSION

Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding rescued New
Jersey v. T.L.O.'s two-pronged standard controlling school searches.
However, the Supreme Court left unanswered some key questions
regarding strip searches that will not only lead to uncertainty among
both school administrators and lower courts but also guarantee future
litigation. Although the Court was very critical of the assistant
principal's investigation, its criticism was terribly understated. The
process that ultimately culminated in Savana Redding's strip search
was inadequate from start to finish.
Justice Souter's opinion defined the "reasonable suspicion"
standard as a "moderate chance" that evidence will be discovered
where the teacher searches.23 1 While the "moderate chance" language
provides some teeth to what is otherwise a highly unstructured
standard, the Court's language is strikingly ordinary, especially when
one understands that this more substantive definition may well extend
beyond school searches and have a significant effect on the untold
numbers of Terry stops.
The Court clarified T.L.O. by acknowledging that "reasonable
suspicion" is a sliding scale.232 Reasonable suspicion in school strip
searches requires a reasonable belief that the child has the object
sought when the search is conducted, and the reasonableness inquiry
limits the scope of the search to the places where the object may be
located. In other words, there must be individualized suspicion to
suspect that the child has concealed the evidence sought in his
underwear or against his body.23 3 Redding, however, did not address
the reasonableness of conducting a strip search when officials fail to
find the object in the course of a less intrusive search. This will be
one potential aspect of future litigation.
The Court was also not clear enough to forestall future questions
about what actually constitutes a strip search. Is it a search down to
underwear, or does it require exposure of breasts and/or genitals? In
this regard, the Court failed to provide guidance that could prevent
future litigation by not providing a clearer definition. In light of this
failure, we have suggested that the definition of a strip search
necessarily differs between a boy and a girl. The definition for a girl
is clear: a girl is strip searched when she is required to remove her
outer clothing and appear before a teacher or administrator for visual
or physical inspection in a bra and panties. Savana Redding was
231

2 32

233

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).

See id. at 2642.
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required to partially expose her breasts and genitals, 234 but under the
broad definition we advocate, the strip search occurred even before
she reached that point.
The definition for a boy, on the other hand, is less clear. Since
removing a shirt is a lesser invasion of privacy, searches of male
students should not be considered strip searches until an administrator
asks a boy to remove his pants and expose his underwear. The Court's
failure to adopt this, or any other definition of strip search, however,
will undoubtedly lead to future litigation. That possibility again raises
the question whether there is sufficient uncertainty in the law to give
rise to qualified immunity for school officials who conduct intrusive
searches, perhaps even after incidents as egregious as that in Redding.
The Supreme Court recognized that strip searches remain a tool
available to schools.235 Absent other facts that would create a
heightened necessity to conduct a more intrusive search, even a
school's drug-free policy does not justify a search for a relatively
harmless substance, such as prescription-strength ibuprofen.236
Schools may only use strip searches when they seek an item that
threatens serious harm to students and others in the building. 237
Whether a small quantity of a more dangerous illegal substance
would warrant a strip search remains unclear.
The Court's decision to grant Wilson qualified immunity in
Redding was also misguided, and could lead to significant confusion
as to when qualified immunity is warranted. Wilson's actions defied
the common sense one would expect in an experienced administrator.
Though the Safford Unified School District did not have a stated
policy regarding school searches and seizures, Wilson's ad hoc
investigation was inconsistent at the most basic level: he conducted
qualitatively different searches on students suspected of violating the
same school rules. That he conducted a less intrusive search of
Marissa Glines, the student caught actually possessing the contraband
school officials sought, is, at best, evidence of a simple oversight
resulting from the lack of an established policy. At worst, however, it
demonstrates that Wilson failed to reflect on the situation as it
developed, and instead relied on post-hoc justifications to explain
otherwise unjustified searches. The problem in Redding occurred
because the investigation was ad hoc and not pursuant to an
established policy. The absence of an established process should
make a strip search presumptively unreasonable, and subject the
2 4
2 35

Id. at 2638.

See id. at 2642 ("The indignity of the [strip] search does not, of course, outlaw it . . .
See id.
27 See id. at 2642-43.
6
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school district and school administrators to civil liability. The
existence of such a policy would serve to guide teachers and
administrators at every step of the process of a strip search. It would
also provide guidance as to when a strip search may be permissible,
and the amount and type of evidence needed to justify it, and it would
dictate the procedures to be followed during an actual search. Absent
such established procedures, a strip search simply should not be a tool
in the school's disciplinary arsenal.
Redding was a step in the right direction, clarifying T.L.O. and
instructing that school strip searches are to be treated as extraordinary
intrusions supported by individualized reasonable suspicion and
subject to the proportionality standard. It is amazing that it took
fifteen years to clarify and apply the law of T.L.O. School children
spend a third of their lives in school in an environment with
ever-shrinking Fourth Amendment rights. If it takes another fifteen
years to enforce Redding, there is the danger that the Fourth
Amendment will totally disappear from our schools, and a new
generation will grow up with no understanding of their fundamental
rights.

